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VALUING PRIVACY 
Youngjae Lee* 
 
Anita Allen’s characteristically rich, fascinating, and thoughtful lecture 
contains much that is worth mulling over.  I find especially interesting her 
description of privacy as a “foundational good,”1 and my comments will 
focus on what it would mean to call privacy a foundational good. 
Professor Allen defines a “foundational good” as a good that, like 
freedom and equality, is a prerequisite for many other important goods.  
She explains: 
[W]e require a “liberty of privacy” to have lives of our own, rich with 
other goods. . . .  For example, if one wants to enjoy the good referred to 
as “reputation,” then anonymity, confidentiality, secrecy, and data 
protection are prerequisites.  If one wants to be a scholar or an artist, then 
opportunities for solitude may be a prerequisite.  Seclusion is a 
prerequisite of forms of intimate relationships (sexual, familial) that thrive 
on unembarrassed self-revelation and free expression.2 
She argues further that, as privacy is a foundational good, “a just and good 
society governed by the rule of law” should have “legal protections for 
foundational privacies,” and this, in a nutshell, is her case for privacy 
rights.3 
I raise two questions here.  First, if privacy is a foundational good, how 
easy should it be for individuals to waive, and, second, how difficult should 
it be to breach?  These two questions are, of course, often raised about a 
variety of rights, but what I am interested in is exploring special tensions 
that may have been introduced by Allen’s formulation of privacy as a good 
that makes other important goods possible. 
First, the language of “rights” suggests the picture of an individual in 
control of his or her own privacy—he or she may or may not waive it and 
reveal parts of himself as he or she sees fit.  One example Allen discusses is 
reputation, which requires, as she points out, “anonymity, confidentiality, 
secrecy, and data protection.”4  However, formation of reputation also 
requires the opposite:  revelation and publicity, at least at times.  This 
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 1. Anita L. Allen, Natural Law, Slavery, and the Right to Privacy Tort, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1187, 1212 (2012); see also ANITA ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY:  WHAT MUST WE 
HIDE? xi, 13, 21, 171 (2011). 
 2. Allen, supra note 1, at 1212. 
 3. Id.; see also ALLEN, supra note 1, at 21. 
 4. Allen, supra note 1, at 1212. 
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example suggests that privacy and its associated goods are not only about 
hiding things, but are also about revealing things at appropriate moments 
under appropriate circumstances, as determined by the holder of privacy. 
At the same time, much of Allen’s lecture is about her discussion, with 
approval, of Judge Andrew Jackson Cobb’s analogy of invasion of privacy 
to slavery in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.5  The slavery 
analogy in turn suggests a right that is so fundamental that it is not 
waivable.  People certainly have a right against slavery, but there is no right 
to be a slave.  If the right of privacy is like the right against slavery, then it 
appears that it should be difficult to waive one’s right to privacy.  But this 
of course cannot be the case.  Not only do people often waive their privacy 
in ways that are unproblematic,6 but Allen’s own discussions of reputation 
and self-revelation in intimate relations also suggest that the right to waive 
one’s privacy is perhaps as important as the right to maintain one’s privacy.  
Otherwise, it is unclear how the kinds of goods that privacy is supposed to 
help people realize will actually be realized. 
Now, of course, this may be a misreading of Allen’s argument.  What is 
like slavery is “invasion of privacy,” not, say, revelation of personal 
information.  When a person waives his or her privacy, there is no invasion 
of privacy; there is only permission.  Therefore, the kinds of concerns I 
raised seem inapposite.  When Allen says that invasion of privacy can be 
like slavery in a deep way, she is not making any statements about the 
moral significance of voluntary waivers of privacy. 
But is it as easy as that?  It is true that Judge Cobb was talking only about 
invasions of privacy and not about waivers of privacy, and Allen’s approval 
of the analogy is by extension also about invasions of privacy and not about 
waivers of privacy.  Yet, as I return to her discussion of confidentiality, 
solitude, and seclusion and their connections to other goods like reputation, 
scholarly or artistic life, and intimate relationships, I see her voicing reasons 
to worry not just about invasions but also about waivers of privacy.  For 
instance, if there is indeed such a strong connection between seclusion and 
intimate relationships, then it seems that one who waives privacy too freely 
may be damaging one’s ability to pursue the goods associated with intimate 
relations, which are very important ingredients of a good life. 
My impression that Allen is worried not just about invasions of privacy 
but also about waivers is confirmed in her book Unpopular Privacy, in 
which she writes that privacy rights “should not be thought of as something 
that can be waived by intended beneficiaries at will.”7  In the book, she also 
makes the following arresting claim:  “[T]he liberal ideal becomes an ironic 
joke in a society in which people freely choose to be always in others’ lines 
of sight, much as it is a joke in a society in which they freely choose utter 
 
 5. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); Allen, supra note 1, at 46–62. 
 6. Allen, supra note 1, at 1212 (“[I]ndividuals often prefer association and disclosure to 
privacy.”). 
 7. ALLEN, supra note 1, at xii. 
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domination.”8  She argues at another point that “[a] degree of paternalism in 
public policies aimed at harm prevention is warranted when it comes to 
foundational liberty (hence the ban on voluntary slavery), and . . . 
foundational privacy.”9  In these sentences, she makes an explicit link 
between lack of privacy and slavery.  And she is talking not just about 
invasions of privacy but also about voluntary waivers of privacy, and is 
warning us that a society in which people excessively waive their right to 
privacy is like a society in which people waive their right to liberty by 
submitting to domination. 
So it appears that my initial worry may be warranted after all.  That is, on 
one hand, in order for privacy to do its work as a foundational good, or a 
good that is a prerequisite for other goods, it must be waivable at 
appropriate moments by the individual.  Yet, because it is such an important 
good, it may be the kind of good that should be difficult to waive, like the 
right to liberty.  How we are to manage this tension is not very clear, and 
the idea that privacy is a foundational good by itself does not provide much 
guidance.  Allen is of course aware of this tension, which is why she says 
that “privacy is often a duty to oneself . . . as well as a right.”10 
Another question is whether privacy, by being a prerequisite to other 
goods, is valuable merely instrumentally, or whether it is an independent 
good, worthy of having for its own sake.  On one hand, Allen’s emphasis 
that it is “foundational” seems to suggest that privacy is valued for its own 
sake, but on the other hand, her explanation that foundational goods are 
important because they enable other goods to be realized suggests that the 
real value of privacy is that it makes it possible for individuals to realize 
other important goods.  What this means is that there may be times when 
these other goods are better realized through sacrifices of the foundational 
good. 
Allen herself seems to have this possibility in mind when she says her 
“perspective is consistent . . . with the notion that privacy rights are not 
absolute and commonly must give way to the demands of security, law 
enforcement, or public health.”11  What this sentence highlights is that 
privacy rights must have limits because of competing considerations.  Of 
course, it is generally the case that rights have limits, need to be specified in 
particular circumstances, and can be traded off at times.  But by calling 
them “rights,” what we are seeking to prevent are situations where 
important interests are given up without special justification.12  However, 
when Allen says that privacy is a good that is important because it serves as 
a prerequisite for other goods, it seems that her vision of rights may be even 
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weaker than what this general and commonly held account of rights 
suggests. 
Here, I return to her discussion of reputation, scholarly or artistic life, and 
intimate relationships.  She says these are the sorts of goods that privacy 
makes possible.  However, it is also the case that privacy can interfere with 
one’s attainment of these goods.  A person who wants to maintain her 
privacy and anonymity at all times and avoids doing things in public will 
only have one kind of reputation, that of someone “who keeps to herself,” 
which, as reputations go, is fairly thin, minimal, and blank.  A scholar or an 
artist who wants to be secluded at all times will not have opportunities for 
scholarly or artistic clashes and exchanges through which one may promote 
and improve one’s work, thereby helping one maintain the life of being a 
scholar or an artist.  A person who is overly protective of his own privacies 
and never learns to overcome his shyness is unlikely to have many 
opportunities to develop intimate relationships.  It seems, then, that there 
may be times when privacy ought to be sacrificed so that these other goods 
that privacy supposedly makes possible may be pursued.  And it may not 
always make sense to leave the decision whether to maintain one’s privacy 
to that individual. 
In other words, built into Allen’s justification of the right to privacy is a 
way to justify sacrificing the right to privacy, because these other goods that 
privacy makes possible may be more important than privacy.  This built-in 
limitation, in turn, provides a ready argument in favor of limiting the right 
to privacy.  This feature of Allen’s justification of the right to privacy may 
in the end be a strength and not a weakness, but it is nevertheless a feature 
that can ultimately render her version of privacy protection weaker than 
what the language of rights suggests. 
So, we end with the following picture:  privacy is a foundational good, 
important for pursuing other goods.  In order for those goods to be pursued, 
individuals must be free to waive the right to privacy, but leaving the 
decision to waive it up to each individual may interfere with his or her 
pursuit of those other goods.  It is a right, not to be interfered with, but if it 
is never interfered with, that too can lead to a situation where important 
goods are not sufficiently realized by individuals.  Individuals should be 
free to waive their privacy protections, but not always.  Privacy must be 
protected but should be sacrificed sometimes.  As Allen is fully aware, it is 
not a tidy picture, but it is difficult to imagine a guide better suited to lead 
us around the complexities than her. 
